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Abstract 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are recognized as one of the most damaging attacks on the Internet security today. Recently, 
malicious web crawlers have been used to execute automated DoS attacks on web sites across the WWW. In this study, we 
examine the use of two unsupervised neural network (NN) learning algorithms for the purpose web-log analysis: the Self-
Organizing Map (SOM) and Modified Adaptive Resonance Theory 2 (Modified ART2). In particular, through the use of SOM 
and Modified ART2, our work aims to obtain a better insight into the types and distribution of visitors to a public web-site based 
on their link-traversal behaviour, as well as to investigate the relative differences and/or similarities between malicious web 
crawlers and other non-malicious visitor groups. The results of our study show that, even though there is a pretty clear separation 
between malicious web-crawlers and other visitor groups, around 8% of malicious crawlers exhibit very ‘human-like’ browsing 
behaviour and as such pose a particular challenge for future web-site security systems. 
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1. Introduction 
The today’s business world is critically dependent on the availability of Internet. For instance, the phenomenal 
growth and success of Internet has transformed the way traditional essential services, such as banking, 
transportation, medicine, education and defence, are operated. In ever increasing numbers, these services are being 
offered by means of Web-based applications. However, the inherent vulnerabilities of the Internet architecture 
provide opportunities for various attacks on the security of Web-based applications. Distributed denial-of-service 
(DDoS) is an especially potent type of security attack, capable of severely degrading the response-rate and quality at 
which Web-based services are offered. According to the United States’ Department of Defence report from 2008, 
presented in [1], the number of cyber attacks (including the DDoS attacks) from individuals and countries, targeting 
economic, political and military organizations, are expected to increase in the future and cost billions of dollars. 
The most common way of conducting a denial of service (DoS) attack is by sending a flood of messages to the 
target (e.g., a machine hosting a web site) with the aim to interfere with the target’s operation, and make it hang, 
crash, reboot, or do useless work. In the past, most DoS attacks were single-sourced, which means they were 
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reasonably easy to prevent by locating and disabling the source of the malicious traffic. Nowadays, however, almost 
all DoS attacks involve a complex, distributed network of attacking machines - comprising hundreds to tens of 
thousands of hijacked zombies. These, the so-called Distributed DoS (or DDoS) attacks, are extremely difficult to 
detect due to the sheer number of hosts participating in the attack. At the same time, they can generate enormous 
amount of traffic towards the victim and result in substantial loss of service and revenue for businesses under the 
attack.  
An emerging (and increasingly more prevalent) type of DDoS attacks, known as application-layer or layer-7 
attacks [2], are shown to be particularly challenging to detect. The reasons for this are: 1) in an application-layer 
attack, the attacker utilizes a legitimate-looking layer-7 network session, and 2) HTML requests sent to a web server 
are often constructed in a way that mimics a semi-random walk through the web site links, and thus appears as a 
web site traversal conducted by a legitimate human user. Given the fact that application-layer DDoS attacks 
resemble the legitimate traffic, it is quite challenging not only to defend against these attacks but also to construct an 
effective metric for their detection. 
So far, a number of studies on the topic of application-layer DDoS attacks have been reported. Thematically, 
these studies can be grouped into two main categories: 1) detection of application-layer DDoS attacks during a flash 
crowd event based on aggregate-traffic analysis ([3] and [4]) and 2) differentiation between well-behaved and 
malicious web crawlers† based on web-log analysis ([5], [6] and [7]). 
The study presented in this paper falls in the latter of the above mentioned categories, as we examine the use of 
two unsupervised neural network (NN) learning algorithms for the purpose web-log analysis: the Self-Organizing 
Map (SOM) [8] and Modified Adaptive Resonance Theory 2 (Modified ART2)‡ [9]. In particular, through the use of 
SOM and ART2, our work aims to obtain a better insight into the types and distribution of visitors to a public web-
site based on their link-traversal behaviour, as well as to investigate the relative differences and/or similarities 
between malicious web crawlers and other non-malicious visitor groups.  
We have chosen to use the SOM and ART algorithms in our study for the following reasons. The SOM algorithm 
is very well known for its ability to produce natural clustering, i.e. clustering that is robust to statistical anomalies. 
Furthermore, unlike other clustering algorithms, the SOM algorithm achieves superior visualisation of high-
dimensional input data in 2D-representation space. The ART2 algorithm, on the other hand, is based on the learning 
paradigm known as ‘stability-plasticity dilemma’, where the exposure to new training data does not destroy 
previously learned information – regardless of the statistical representation of different dataset groups. 
Consequently, ART2 has a unique ability to identify statistically underrepresented but significant clusters, and is 
greatly suited for imbalanced datasets. Also, by employing unsupervised learning, the process that labels sessions 
without previous a priori knowledge, we can discover unbiased sessions distributions in the underlying data. 
The content of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we discuss previous works on web crawler 
detection. In Section 3, we give an overview of our web-log analyzer that is used to generate a meaningful training 
dataset out of any given access log file. In Section 4, we briefly outline our experimentation setup. In Section 5, we 
present and discuss the obtained web-session clustering results. In Section 6, we conclude the paper with our final 
remarks. 
2. Related work 
So far, several research studies have looked at the use of supervised learning for the purposes of data-mining 
and/or clustering of web sessions. Note that supervised learning process clusters sessions based on previous a priori 
knowledge. In one of the first such studies [10], the authors attempt to discover distinct groups of web robot sessions 
by applying C.4.5 algorithm (i.e. a decision tree classifier) to 25-dimensional feature vector space. The 25 features, 
 
† Web-crawlers are programs that traverse the Internet autonomously, starting from a seed list of web pages and then recursively visiting 
documents accessible from that list. Crawlers are also referred to as robots (bots), wanderers, spiders, or harvesters. Their primary purpose is to 
discover and retrieve content and knowledge from the Web on behalf of various Web-based systems and services. For instance, search-engine 
crawlers seek to harvest as much Web content as possible on a regular basis, in order to build and maintain large search indexes. On the other 
hand, shopping bots crawl the Web to compare prices and products sold by different e-commerce sites. Malicious crawlers are type of web robots 
that, for instance, generate DDoS traffic that can overwhelm web server’s resources and thus limit or unable legitimate users’ access to the 
website. Another example of malicious activity attributed to malicious crawlers is collecting email addresses for spam mail. 
‡ Modified ART2 is a variation of the original ART algorithm [18]. Its advantages over the original algorithm are: 1) stable learning that results 
in gradually increasing/merging clusters, and 2) learning/clustering that can be terminated either when the radius of the formed clusters reaches 
some predetermined size, or when the number of formed clusters reaches some predetermined number. 
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i.e. their respective values, are derived from the navigational properties of each identified robot session. In advance 
of clustering, and depending on the value of user-agent fields, each session is pre-labelled as known robots, known 
browsers, possible robots, and possible browsers. The results of the study show that, by applying the proposed 
feature set in combination with C.4.5 algorithm, robots can be detected with more than 90% accuracy after only four 
web-page requests. In [11], the authors utilize supervised Bayesian classifier to detect the presence of web crawlers 
from web server logs and, subsequently, they compare their results to the results obtained with the decision tree 
technique. The proposed methodology achieves very high recall and precision values in web robot detection. 
Another study utilizing logistic regression and decision trees has been reported in [6]. In this study, authors propose 
a robot detection tool that speeds up the tasks for pre-processing web server access logs and achieves very accurate 
web robot detection. 
Several studies have looked at the use of unsupervised learning for the purpose of more general web log analysis. 
In [12], the authors employ the SOM algorithm to achieve automatic demographic-based classification of web-site 
visitors based on the number and sequence of their web-page visits. In [13], the authors also examine the application 
of the SOM algorithm on web-server access logs, with the aim to group web-visitors thematically and, as a result of 
that, help them find relevant information in a shorter period of time. In a similar study [14], the authors propose 
employing the ART algorithms to cluster web users according to their thematic interests. 
In the view of the previous works, the novelty of our research is twofold. Firstly, to the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first study that applies unsupervised learning to the problem of web-visitor categorization, ultimately 
aiming to promote effective differentiation between malicious web-crawlers and other (non-malicious) visitor 
groups to a web site. (Note, in [12], [13], and [14], only human web-visitors have been considered, and little to no 
attention has been given to automated web-crawlers.) Secondly, this is the first study that attempts to examine the 
actual, qualitative differences between malicious web-crawlers and other non-malicious crawler types, such as 
Googlebot and MSNbot, by applying the SOM-based data visualisation methods. 
3. Pre-processing of server logs 
In our study, a Java-based log analyzer has been utilized to pre-process the web server access-log files. A typical 
web server access log file includes the information such as the IP address/host name of the site visitor, the URL of 
requested page, the date and time of the request, the size of the data requested and the HTTP method of request. 
Additionally, the log contains the user agent string describing the hardware and/or software the visitor was using to 
access the site, and the referrer field which specifies the web page by which the client reached the current page. 
On each provided access log file, our log analyzer performs the following: 1) scans the entries in the log to 
identify unique visitor sessions, and 2) for each identifies session, the analyzer examines its key features to generate 
the sessions’ 9-dimensional feature-vector representation. 
In the reminder of this section, we provide a detailed description of the above mentioned processes – session 
identification and generation of sessions’ feature-vector representations – as performed by our log analyzer. (Note, 
the aggregate of the obtained feature-vectors represents the actual training data-set that is to be fed into the SOM 
and Modified ART2 algorithm.) We close this section with the description of data-set labelling process – a step that 
needs to be performed in order be able to comprehend and validate the results of the clustering process. 
3.1. Session identification 
Session identification is the process of dividing a server access log into sessions. Typically, session identification 
is performed by: 1) grouping of all HTTP requests that originate from the same IP address and are described by the 
same user-agent string, and 2) by applying a timeout approach to break this grouping into unique sessions. 
Therefore, a session is defined as a sequence of requests coming from the same IP address (and is described by the 
same user-agent string) and where the time-lapse between any two consecutive HTTP requests in the sequence is 
within a pre-defined threshold. The key challenge of session identification is to determine the proper value of the 
given threshold, as different Web users exhibit different navigational behaviour. In this study, we employ a 30-
minute threshold, because it has generated fairly successful web crawler classification results in the past (see [11]). 
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3.2. Features 
From previous studies on web session analysis, namely [6], [10] and [11], we have adopted seven different 
features that are shown to be useful in identifying and distinguishing between automated and human visitors to a 
web site. These features are enlisted below: 
1. Click rate – a numerical attribute calculated as the number of HTTP requests sent by a user in a single session. 
The click rate metric appears to be useful in detecting the presence of the web crawlers because higher click rate 
can only be achieved by an automated script (such as a web robot) and is usually very low for a human visitor. 
2. HTML-to-Image Ratio – a numerical attribute calculated as the number of HTML page requests over the number 
of image file (JPEG and PNG) requests sent in a single session. Web crawlers generally request mostly HTML 
pages and ignore images on the site which implies that HTML-to-Image ratio would be higher for web crawlers 
than for human users. 
3. Percentage of PDF/PS file requests – a numerical attribute calculated as the percentage of PDF/PS file requests 
sent in a single session. In contrast to image requests, some crawlers, tend to have a higher percentage of 
PDF/PS requests than human visitors. 
4. Percentage of 4xx error responses – a numerical attribute calculated as the percentage of erroneous HTTP 
requests sent in a single session. Crawlers typically would have higher rate of erroneous request since they have 
higher chance of requesting outdated or deleted pages. 
5. Percentage of HTTP requests of type HEAD – a numerical attribute calculated as percentage of requests of 
HTTP type HEAD sent in a single session. Most web crawlers, in order to reduce the amount of data requested 
from a site, employ the HEAD method when requesting a web page. On the other hand, requests coming from a 
human user browsing a web site via browsers are, by default, of type GET. 
6. Percentage of requests with unassigned referrers – a numerical attribute calculated as the percentage of blank or 
unassigned referrer fields set by a user in a single session. Typically, web crawlers would initiate HTTP requests 
with unassigned referrer field. 
7. ‘Robots.txt’ file request – a nominal attribute with values of either 1 or 0, indicating whether ‘robots.txt’ file was 
requested or not requested by a user during a session, respectively. Web administrators, through the Robots 
Exclusion Protocol, use a special-format file called robots.txt to indicate to visiting robots which parts of their 
sites should not be visited by the robot. For example, when a robot visits a Web-site, say 
http://www.cse.yorku.ca, it should first check for http://www.cse.yorku.ca/robots.txt. It is unlikely, that any 
human would check for this file, since there is no link from the website to this file, nor are (most) users aware of 
its existence. 
As mentioned earlier, features 1-7 have been used in the past for distinguishing between human- and robot-
initiated sessions. However, based on the recommendations and discussion presented in [15], we introduce two 
novel features for characterization of web-browsing sessions: 
8. Standard deviation of requested page’s depth – a numerical attribute calculated as the standard deviation of page 
depth across all requests sent in a single session. For instance, we assign a depth of three to a web page 
‘/cshome/courses/index.html’ and a depth of two to a web page ‘/cshome/calendar.html’. 
9. Percentage of consecutive sequential HTTP requests – a numerical attribute calculated as the number of 
sequential requests for pages belonging to the same web directory and generated during a single user session. For 
instance, a series of requests for web pages matching pattern ‘/cshome/course/*.* will be marked as consecutive 
sequential HTTP requests. However, a request to web page ‘/cshome/index.html’ followed by a request to a web 
page ‘cshome/courses/index.html’ will not be marked as consecutive sequential requests. 
The importance of features 8 and 9 can be explained as follows. In a typical web-browsing session, humans are 
set to find information of interest by following a series of thematically correlated and progressively more specific 
links. Loops may also be present if a human becomes disoriented during their visit. In contrast, robots are neither 
expected to have such complex navigational patterns, nor would they be restricted by the link structure of the web 
site. After an initial crawl of a site, robots are capable of learning precisely where the information that they are 
seeking resides, so that on repeated visits they may only send requests for specific files or restrict their crawling to 
specific areas of the site. For the above reasons, the standard deviation of requested pages’ depths, i.e. attribute 8, 
should be low for web robot sessions since a web robot should scan over a narrower directory structure of a web site 
than a human user.  
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Also the number of resources requested in a single session is another distinction between robot and human traffic 
that is not expected to change over time. This distinction arises because human users retrieve information from the 
Web via some interface, such as a web browser. This interface forces the user’s session to request additional 
resources automatically. Most Web browsers, for example, retrieve the HTML page, parse through it, and then send 
a barrage of requests to the server for embedded resources on the page such as images, videos, and client side scripts 
to execute. Thus, the temporal resource request patterns of human visitors are best represented as short bursts of a 
large volume of requests followed by a period of little activity. In contrast, web robots are able to make their own 
decisions about what resources linked on an HTML page to request, and may choose to execute the scripts available 
on a site only if they have the capacity to do so. For the above reasons, it is reasonable to expect that the number of 
consecutive sequential HTTP requests would be relatively high in human user sessions and relatively low in web 
robot sessions. 
3.3. Dataset labelling 
Once the training data-set (comprising feature-vector representations) is generated, the log analyzer labels each 
feature-vector as belonging to one of the following 4 categories: human visitors, well-behaved web crawlers, 
malicious crawlers and unknown visitors. The goal of data labelling is to facilitate our understanding and validation 
of the results that are to be obtained by the actual clustering process. Namely, through quick association of feature-
vectors corresponding to a cluster with their pre-assigned labels, we hope to be able to obtain a better understanding 
of the cluster’s nature and significance. 
The labelling of feature vectors is performed as follows:  
1. Any feature vector that corresponds to a web session whose user agent string matches a known browser and does 
not access the ‘robots.txt’ file is labelled as human visitors. 
2. Any feature vector that corresponds to a web session whose user agent string matches a known well-behaved 
web crawler is labelled as well-behaved web crawlers. 
3. Any feature vector that corresponds to a web session whose user agent string matches a known malicious web 
crawler is placed in a cluster of malicious web crawlers. Also any web session whose user agent string matches a 
known browser’s user agent string and accesses the ‘robots.txt’ file is also placed in a cluster of malicious web 
crawlers. Additionally, any unknown session that neither belongs to a well-behaved web crawler or malicious 
crawler but accesses the ‘robots.txt’ file is also placed in a cluster of malicious web crawlers. 
4. All other web sessions are labelled as unknown visitors. 
(Note, the log analyzer maintains a table of user agent fields of all known, malicious or well-behaved, web 
crawlers. This table can be built from the data found on web sites [16] and [17]. The web sites also maintain the list 
of various browsers’ user agent strings that can be used to identify human visitors to the site as well.) 
4. Experimental design 
4.1. Training data 
In the experimental stage of our study, the training data sets were constructed by pre-processing web server 
access log files provided by York CSE department. The log file stores detailed information about user web-based 
access into the domain www.cse.yorku.ca during a 4-week interval - between mid January 2011 and mid February 
2011. There are a total of about 3 million log entries in the file.  
Since we are investigating the behaviour as evident from the click-stream of a user-agent, it is fair to assume that 
Table 1. Class distribution in the dataset 
 Number of Sessions 
Total # 55920 
Total # of Human Sessions 51252 
Total # of Well-behaved Crawler Sessions  1391 
Total # of Malicious Crawler Sessions 1020 
Total # of Unknown Visitor Sessions 2257 
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any session with less than 5 requests in total, is too short to enable labelling, and therefore is ignored in our analysis. 
Table 1 lists the number of sessions and class label distributions generated by the log analyzer.  
4.2. Clustering algorithms 
The detection of web crawlers was evaluated with the following two unsupervised neural network algorithms: 
SOM and Modified ART2. The implementation of SOM algorithm is provided within MATLAB as a part of Neural 
Network Toolbox software package. We have chosen a SOM comprising 100 neurons in 10-by-10 hexagonal 
arrangement. The map was trained with 200 epochs. The Modified ART2 implementation was based on the pseudo-
code outlined in [9]. The algorithm was executed with ρmax = 1.4, Δρ = 0.1 and nmax = 6. All input vectors were 
normalized prior to being fed to SOM and Modified ART2. 
5. Clustering results 
5.1. SOM results 
Figure 1 displays the results of dataset clustering obtained with a 10-by-10 neuron SOM. On each of the shown 
maps, the size of the blue region inside a neuron’s hexagon depicts the number of session hits for that neuron, i.e. 
number of sessions whose feature vectors end up firing the (same) given neuron. The exact number of a neuron’s 
session hits is also explicitly provided within the neuron’s hexagon region. 
The map in Figure 1.a) shows the neuron hits for all sessions, and thus helps us visualise the actual distribution of 
the training dataset (i.e. helps us get an idea about the number, size and spatial proximity of the dataset’s most 
dominant clusters). Figures 1.b) to 1.e) show the neuron hits for sessions that were pre-labelled as belonging to 
human, well-behaved crawler, malicious crawler and unknown visitors, respectively. From the obtained maps, the 
following interesting conclusions can be drawn: 
x Human vs. crawlers sessions: Based on the distribution of fired neurons in Figure 1.b), 1.c) and 1.d), 
there appears to be a pretty good separation between human visitor sessions and web-crawler sessions (both 
malicious and well-behaved). Namely, while crawler sessions are almost exclusively associated with neurons in 
the lower left corner of the map, human sessions are spread over a large area of the map, with most human 
sessions firing the neurons in the upper right corner of the map. It might be worth pointing out that the large 
spread of fired neurons in the map of Figure 1.b) is not an indicator of greater variability in humans sessions 
compared to other session groups. Instead, it is the result of the statistical dominance of training-data 
corresponding to human sessions - see Table 1. (As indicated in the introduction, the SOM algorithm produces 
results that are dependent on the input data density; hence, data clusters with higher density tend to ‘win-over’ a 
larger number of SOM neurons, regardless of their inter-cluster variance.) 
x Sessions that are labeled as human but ‘behave’ like malicious crawlers: A detailed inspection of 
Figures 1.b) and 1.d) reveals that, in spite of the well-formed separation between human and malicious web-
crawlers, a percentage of sessions/visitors that declare themselves as regular (human) visitors end up firing 
neurons in the region (or close to the region) dominated by malicious web-crawlers – lower left corner of the 
map. This observation raises the question whether those sessions, in fact, correspond to malicious crawlers 
whose aim is to bypass web-site security by purposely falsifying the value of user agent string field. Recall, user 
agent string appears as a parameter in HTML requests, and can be (relatively) easily altered. 
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1.a) All sessions neuron hits 1.b) Human Visitor sessions hits 
                 
1.c) Well-behaved Crawler sessions hits 1.d) Malicious Crawler sessions hits 
 
1.e) Unknown Visitor sessions associations with neurons 
Fig. 1. Session Hits per Neuron visualized in 2 dimensional SOM Map 
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x Sessions that are labeled as malicious crawlers but ‘behave’ like humans: A detailed inspection of Figures 
1.b) and 1.d) also reveals that a number of sessions/visitors that are identified as malicious crawlers end up firing 
neurons in the region dominated by human generated sessions – upper right corner of the map. (It is reasonable 
to assume that these visitors are indeed malicious crawlers, as it is unlikely that any regular human visitor would 
change the value of its agent string into ‘malicious crawler’, thus risking to be blocked by the web-site.) 
Accordingly, this observation implies that the behavior of some malicious crawlers - those that fire the nodes in 
the upper right corner - is very similar to the behavior of regular users. It should be obvious that such malicious 
crawlers are potentially very dangerous. Namely, had they attempted to falsify the value of agent string (i.e. 
declare themselves as regular visitors), they would have ‘perfectly’ blended into the population of regular human 
visitors, and would be very hard to detect by the web-site’s security system.  
x Unknown visitor sessions: As explained in Section 3.3, unknown visitor sessions are sessions whose user 
agent strings are not known and thus are not enlisted on [16] and [17]. By comparing Figures 1.b and 1.e), it is 
interesting to observe that there is a significant overlap between fired neurons in the respective maps. This leads 
us to conclude that most unknown sessions are likely generated by regular human users, i.e. are likely non-
malicious by their behavior and intent. 
5.2. ART2 results 
Figure 2 displays the results of dataset clustering using Modified ART2. The plot displays the ratio of each 
session type (human, well-behaved crawler, malicious crawler and unknown visitor) per cluster placement. A 
session is placed in cluster i, if its 9-dimensional vector representation is the closest (measured in the Euclidean 
distance) to the center of cluster i among all other clusters. The plot displays the sample results when Modified 
ART2 algorithm generates 6 clusters of sessions.  
While the results obtained with SOM are useful for obtaining information about the spatial distribution, i.e. 
proximity, of data clusters, Modified ART2 gives us an insight into the inter-cluster variance. (As indicated in the 
introduction, Modified ART2 creates equal-size clusters and is not influenced by statistical irregularities in the 
training dataset.) With this in mind, and by expecting Figure 2, we derive the following conclusions: 
x Human sessions: Nearly 96% of human sessions fall into cluster 1, thus suggesting a very small variance 
of this cluster group. In practical terms, this implies that most human web users follow a very similar web 
browsing pattern. 
x Unknown sessions: 95% of unknown sessions belong to the same cluster as human sessions. This confirms 
our hypothesis from section 5.1, that most unknown sessions are in fact human-generated. 
x Malicious web-crawler sessions: Out of all session groups, malicious crawlers exhibit the greatest 
variability – they are spread over all 6 formed clusters, with most being assigned to cluster 2. It is interesting to 
observe that nearly 8% of malicious web-crawler sessions are assigned to cluster 1, together with human visitors. 
This again confirms our earlier hypothesis, that some malicious web crawlers behave very-much like regular 
users, and in the case of a falsified user agent string value their detection would have present a particular 
challenge. 
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6. Conclusion and final remarks 
The detection of malicious web crawlers is one of the most active research areas in network security. In this 
paper, we approach the problem of malicious web-crawler detection through the use of unsupervised neural 
learning. 
The following important conclusions were derived from our study: 
There exists a pretty good separation between malicious and non-malicious web users in terms of their browsing 
behaviour. And, while human visitors tend to follow rather similar browsing patterns (i.e. human visitors exhibit 
similar web browsing characteristics in terms of the average values of the 9 features), malicious web crawlers 
exhibit a range of browsing strategies (i.e. malicious sessions are spread over greater number of clusters in Figure 
2). Moreover, nearly 8% of web crawlers exhibit very much ‘human-like’ browsing behaviour. With a higher level 
of sophistications, these crawlers could pose a serious challenge for future web-site security systems. 
The results presented in our study do not provide insights on how to develop detection signatures for malicious 
bots. However, given the clear separation between malicious and non-malicious web sessions, network security 
personnel can employ the mean and variance values of the 9 features as guidance in building signatures that can 
detect malicious crawlers. We plan to analyze and present the exact values of these metrics in a future journal paper. 
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